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ABSTRACT. 
Russia has experienced two momentous revolutions during the 
twentieth century. The overthrow of the czar in 1917 began the 
first. After a brief attempt at democratic rule, Lenin's Bolshevik 
Communists seized power in 1918 and established a totalitarian 
government, naming the remade Russian empire as the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. 
The seeds of the second revolution were sown with the elevation in 
1985 of the reform minded Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of 
the Soviet Communist Party. His reforms, including perestroika 
(restructuring) and glasnost (openness, including limited 
democracy)unleashed strong forces within the Soviet Union. The 
revolution that Gorbachev's reforms promoted-or at least 
contributed to-reached a crisis stage in 1991. 
The old guard communist party leaders, whose positions of power 
were being threatened by both perestroika and the demands of many 
of the Soviet Union's constituent republics for greater autonomy, 
staged a coup against Gorbachev on August 18. The coup collapsed 
within days, however, in part because hundreds of thousands of 
Soviet citizens took to the streets to rally against it. Boris 
Yeltsin, the president of Russia (then a Soviet republic), was the 
most visible symbol of democratic defiance of the old guard. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the already weak Soviet state 
lapsed into a terminal coma. Central authority dissipated. Real 
power shifted rapidly to Yeltsin's office in the Russian White 
House and to the other 14 republics, which moved rapidly toward 
independence. On December 25, 1991 the Soviet flag was lowered for 
last time from atop the Kremlin and the Russian flag was raised in 
its stead. 
Of the former Soviet republics (FSU's), Russia is by far the 
largest, and the most powerful. Russia has retained all the 
Soviets Union's tactical nuclear weapons and the vast majority of 
its strategic-range nuclear weapons. These factors make the course 
of Russia a matter of great concern for the world. 
It is the purpose of this paper to explore the history of the 
reform process, the current political and economic situation in 
Russia, the process in establishing free market mechanisms and the 
realities in opportunity for foreign direct investment in Russia. 
A STUDY OF RUSSIA AND THE OPPORTUNITIES IT OFFERS FOREIGN 
INVESTORS. 
BLEAK STATISTICS, BLEAK POLITICS. 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION. 
INTRODUCTION 
In one of his early short stories, "Martyona's Home," Aleksandr I. 
Solzhenitsyn wrote a hauntingly prophetic passage about a prisoner 
coming home from the labor camps : 
"in the summer of 1953 I was corning back from the dusty desert , 
just following my nose - so long as it led me back to European 
Russia. Nobody waited for me at any particular place, because I 
was a little matter of ten years over due. I just wanted to efface 
myself, to loose myself in deepest Russia .... if it was there."' 
Solhenitsyn will in a sense be following his nose back to European 
Russia, the question is whether there is a Russia that waits or 
wants him, and whether his "deepest Russia" is still there. 
Solhenitsyn has left no doubt of his ardent longing to devote his 
authority and his final years to help his beloved motherland 
recover from the ' plague of communism' . 
As to whether "deepest Russia" is still there, for most part of the 
Russian hinterland remains much as Solhenitsyn left it - muddy, 
backward, provincial and poor. But Russia has changed and changed 
dramatically, a state in which a tyrannical system ordered 
everything and in which every life was caught in compromises and 
small lies. But the tyranny also showed human traits - conscience, 
courage, weakness, cynicism - in far sharper relief, much as war 
exposes strength and cowardice. Every Russian was confronted with 
endless choices between integrity and compromises, and there were 
none who escaped unscathed. Most people simply struggled to 
maintain the modicum of personal integrity in the face of the 
state's demand for fealty. It was a harsh and cruel world, but 
also one in which whispered truths and smuggled books carried 
weight greater than money or status, in which people of conscience 
forged powerful bonds and defiance was a mark of greatness. 
INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIA: The USSR, spanning eleven time zones and 
covering one sixth of the world's land sources is geographically 
the largest country in the world. About one quarter of its 
territory falls in Europe and the remainder in Asia. 
In recognition of national differences, the USSR broke up and was 
divided administratively into 14 republics. Russia, which was 
officially called Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, 
I 
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embraces both the major ethnic Russian concentration and vast but 
sparsely populated territories in Siberia, the Arctic and the Far 
East. Russia accounts for three quarters of the total area and 
half the total population of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). 
Independent Russia is the worlds largest country and the fifth most 
populous. Russia area totals 17,075 thousand sq. kilometers of 
76.2% of the FSU. The total population is 148,041,000 or 51.3% of 
the FSU. The population is concentrated at 8.7 persons per sq. 
kilometer and is 74% urbanized. 
Russia is extremely rich in natural resources. Extensive areas are 
ideal for agriculture, especially the famous "black soil" belt. 
Forests cover over half of the FSU with an overwhelming share 
located in Russia, which accounts for 52% of the total timber 
production. Fuel and natural resources for which the FSU is 
extremely rich are mainly concentrated in Russia. 
Over 60% of NMP is generated in Russia, with an additional 20% 
originating in Byelorussia and the Ukraine. In agriculture Russia 
and the Ukraine generate 68% of total value added. Russia has the 
highest levels of foreign economic activity amounting to 9% of the 
NMP in 1988. Russia's per capita income was also among the highest 
at 110% of the FSU average. 
PRE-REFORM RUSSIA. After achieving high rates of growth by world 
standards in the 1960's the Soviet economy entered a period of 
decline in the 1970's. NMP official growth rates for Russia 
averaged 7.8% in the 1960's and the fell to 4.4% in 1971-85 and 
only 2.7% in 1986-89. On a per capita basis the last two periods 
showed growth of 3.5% and 1.7% respectively. Since the official 
statistics were always exaggerated the real decline must have been 
even more significant. 
Overall the figures can only give a limited understanding of the 
real economic situation that eventually forced the reforms. For an 
average Soviet citizen the quality of life visibly deteriorated in 
the 70's and 80's. In addition the Soviet Union found itself 
economically and technologically unable to compete with the United 
States for world dominance. Long driven by the dreams for world 
domination , the Soviet Union found themselves falling behind, 
especially after Reagan's military buildup and the "star wars" 
program. Continuing the competition meant total economic collapse 
at home which the totalitarian system could not afford. 
THE REFORM PROCESS. The reform process in Russia cannot be 
characterized as a set out or coherent reform program. It began as 
an experiment to preserve the Soviet Union by Gorbachev, but soon 
deteriorated into a haphazard process of changes in the economy and 
the political system of the country conducted by several 
consecutive governments. 
Soon after assuming his post Gorbachev began his first effort to 
improve the situation. The program termed "acceleration", was 
designed to revive economic growth by tackling three of the 
perceived major defects in the economy, inefficiency, poor quality 
and lagging technological development. Although the problems to be 
addressed were systematic in nature the strategy remained an effort 
to improve the functioning of the existing system, rather than to 
change it fundamentally. First, a major re-tooling of the industry 
was planned. Second, a strenuous quality improvement program was 
implemented. Third, a series of measures were taken with the 
intention of stimulating the "human factor" by personal changes, 
and work incentives in the industry. 
This campaign, however, quickly ran into a series of problems. 
This policy of "acceleration" failed at an early stage in 1987. A 
more serious push began in 1987, the goal remained the same, which 
was to improve the existing system . Two other major changes were 
made in 1987. First, firms were allowed to negotiate "contract" 
prices for new goods. Although there were strict controls on these 
prices the move was designed to encourage production of needed 
goods. However, the limits proved to strict to induce any visible 
improvements. Second, private ownership in the form of 
cooperatives were allowed. This had some effect in creating 
private sector jobs and some needed consumer goods but the 
limitations and obstructions by authorities prevented cooperatives 
from playing a significant role until 1990. 
Under Gorbachev the reform was limited to delegation of more 
authority to state owned enterprises, some liberalization of the 
private economic activity and more rights and privileges granted to 
local administrations and other republics as well as relaxation of 
political control over the population. At this time Gorbachev 
tried to preserve some versions of a command socialist economy and 
a reworked version of the Soviet Union. 
The disintegrating economic situation in Russia and the rise of 
nationalist tensions motivated local governments to pursue 
independent policies, introduce border customs and patrols, visa 
requirements, tariffs and export regulations. The gradual collapse 
of the Rouble began in 1989, and the worsening economic situation 
were essentially instrumental in motivating the Republics to try 
and achieve control over their economies by issuing their own 
currencies. As Gorbachev had not believed in the concept of a 
market economy, his attempts at reform were counterproductive. By 
August 1991, he had reviewed and rejected 13 reform programs, 
including the radical "500 day" plan of September 1990. Thus, 
having made very little progress with reforms, Gorbachev was forced 
out. But, as many say, Gorbachev's greatness lay in his capacity 
to destroy everything he tried to save - his party's monopoly on 
power, its idealogy and its empire. 
REFORMS UNDER YELTSIN AN]) GAIDAR. Trying to give impetus to the 
Union Treaty Gorbachev acquiesced to the election of the President 
of Russia while himself remaining President of the Soviet Union. 
Gorbachev in fact was holding an empty crown. Yeltsin was soon 
elected as Russia's first President in June of 1991 onreform 
platform. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Gorbachevls 
departure he got a free hand at reform. He appointed a economist 
Gaidar as Prime Minister and the latter pressed on with a radical 
but disorganized reform plan. Their aim was to break down 
everything and then re-build. The reform package was radical and 
included a radical price liberalization and massive privatization 
program. This reform program was based on stringent requirements 
of the IMF regarding macro-economic stabilization, price 
liberalization, financial and credit-monetary policy. Prices on 
monopolies were lifted. With these price rises the government 
eliminated most shortages plaguing Russia. By cutting the budget 
deficit they avoided hyperinflation. Concurrently the privatization 
scheme was initiated. 
In 1992 the fall in production began to resemble disintegration . 
The overall drop in production reached 18%. In addition , instead 
of a deficit less budget promised by the government as late as the 
first quarter of 1992 the federal budget deficit rose to nearly 10% 
of the GDP. The non-payment in the economy reached 78"sf the GDP. 
Taxes became too oppressive for whatever private enterprises there 
were. The Congress and the Central Bank began printing money in 
droves and extending massive amounts of credits to the industrial 
enterprises. This eased the non-payment crises and was popular in 
the industrial sector, but fueled a sudden rise in inflation. This 
in turn led to the collapse of the Rouble in dollar terms. This 
process has been colorfully, if somewhat skeptically, described as 
a "not the birth of a market economy, but a gigantic fire sale of 
the Soviet Union. Ex-communists, their 'reform-minded', children, 
and western carpetbaggers have got in on the hugest asset stripping 
operation in history."' 
The success of the neo-fascists and former communist parties 
including the communist parties and the agrarians (rural 
2ruble or rubble? time, October 1994 
communists) forced Yeltsin to retort to a more nationalistic stance 
and to slow the reform process designed to soften the socio- 
economic impact on the population. In the process reformers like 
Mr. Gaidar and Mrs. Fedorov quit the government and remained the 
leaders of the largest party in the Duma - treform Russia's Choice. 
The composition of the Russian State Duma (lower house of 
parliament) after the December 15, 1993  election^.^ 
Party % Votes 
Russia's Choice 15.38 
Liberal Democrats 22.79 
Communist 12.79 
Agrarian 7.90 
Yablokoo 7.83 
Civic Union 1.92 
Democrats 5.50 
Dignity & Charity 0.70 
Russian Unity 6.76 
Women of Russia 8.10 
Russian Movement for 
Democratic Reform 4.06 
Seats Plus single 
constituency 
Total seats 
Parties not listed 
Independents 
THE NEM CONSTITUTION. The newly ratified Russian constitution is 
now the supreme law of the Russian Federation on which all other 
laws and regulations will be based. It is necessary to be familiar 
with the major premises of this constitution to understand the 
possible course of further development of the reform process. 
The constitution establishes the principle of three branches of 
government, but with a strong presidency, rather like the French 
Republic. Under a list of transitional provisions, laws and other 
legal acts adapted before the new constitution takes effect, are to 
continue in force to the extent that they are not in conflict with 
the new constitution. 
3what is russian for free press? economist, January 1994. 
When Yeltsin unveiled the final draft in a nationwide television 
address on November 9,, 1993 he said that Russia needs 'a durable 
legal order. ' The constitution finally clearly defines the 
separation of power between the president and parliament, it sets 
rights, proclaims some free market business principles and 
establishes an independent judiciary. This should be of comfort to 
Russian democrats and foreign investors alike. However, there is 
a possibility for further conflict since the new Federal Assembly 
may begin to chafe under a constitutional structure that creates a 
strong presidency. The strong relationship between the federal 
government and the regions was also changed to create a stronger 
center, which is likely to create a source of ongoing tensions with 
the local authorities that have grown to like the nearly total lack 
of central control during the last two years. The final draft 
drops references to local sovereignty, which will anger the 
localities and the minorities. 
The constitution guarantees a wide array of free market oriented 
business principles including the right to own land and other 
property, right to free movement of resources, protection from 
expropriation and for intellectual property. 
REFORM PROGRAM FOR 1993-1995. In August 1993 The Russian 
Federation Government set forth a working version of its Reform 
Program for 1993-1995. In the document the current situation was 
characterized by an unstable balance. Although the rapid decline 
of the Russian economy has been halted along with the possibility 
of economic growth there is a danger for a relapse into further 
decline. Accordingly the government has to aggressively continue 
its reform efforts in order to push the economy towards growth in 
the nearest future. 
The main reform efforts of the government are tied into its anti 
inflationary measures. To this goal the Russian government has 
reached an agreement with the Central Bank to slow the growth of 
the money supply. In addition several measures have been adopted 
to combat an inflationary rise in the budget deficit. The 
government has eliminated some ineffective social programs, 
proposed an across the board 15% spending cut and a moratorium on 
new spending on the spending side. On the revenue side the 
government will impose a new tax on natural gas production, raise 
to 30% a tax on oil production and institute new measures designed 
to combat tax evasion. 
Another major aspect of reforms is the privatization program. The 
main goal is to convert state enterprises into joint-stock 
companies which will include not only the manufacturing facilities 
but also the research and development and engineering centers. 
Despite this relatively gloomy short term forecast many believe 
that the long term outlook remains promising. The reform program 
has made an irreversible transformation of the Russian economy and 
produced a large shift to privatized enterprises, and at the very 
least a market oriented economy and a democratically minded 
society. 
AGRICULTURE. Agriculture remains a very important part of the 
Russian economy. While there is tremendous potential in this 
sector it remains ineffective and wasteful. Prior to the 1917 
revolution Russia was an exporter of grain and other agricultural 
produce. Now it imports over 15% of its annual needs consuming most 
of the available foreign currency reserves. Until the agricultural 
sector begins feeding the Russian population the economic situation 
will remain difficult. 
Towards the end of 1992 Gaidar informed the public that free pieces 
of land would come into effect from 1993. Since then a significant 
number of state farms have been privatized. In the summer of 1993 
private farmers accounted for 600,000 (about 7%) of the 9.9 million 
agricultural work force, covering 3.8% of stock farmland and 2% of 
sown land. Private farms and small family plots, which together 
constitute about 8% of the agricultural land, and produce as much 
as 33% of the nation's agricultural products suffer a severe 
infrastructure problems. The Russian agricultural sector was 
geared towards large collective state farms and accordingly there 
is no structure to provide farmers with credit, insurance, small 
scale equipment or expert advice. 
The major law on land privatization was issued in December 1993. 
It gives the right to own land and dispose of it freely. The 
reform process in the agricultural sector has begun and the 
necessary legislative groundwork has been laid. However until the 
infrastructure and other problems are resolved farmers will be 
reluctant to leave the state farms t stake out on their own and 
until they do so in massive numbers the agricultural shortages will 
continue . 
CHAPTER 11: CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. 
ANALYSIS OF 1992-1993. The years 1992 and 1993 were characterized 
by a deep crisis of falling GDP, physical output and living 
standards. At the same time inflation soared and unemployment 
slowly increased. This fall in output was not caused by a 
restrictive domestic fiscal and monetary policy - they have 
actually been too lax - but it is mainly the result of the lack of 
a clear coordinating mechanism's in the production and distribution 
system of the state enterprise. The system of state orders has 
been abandoned and enterprises do not find it profitable or because 
they cannot afford or obtain the required inputs. This difficulty 
will lessen in time as managers get used to market oriented systems 
of distribution and the continued progress of the privatization 
process. But in the meantime the consequences of reform on the 
production levels have been disastrous. 
As separate enterprises and even industries are privatized they are 
forced to function in a market place that is still dominated by 
monopolistic state owned producers. In addition such free market 
attributes as business services, accounting and consulting firms, 
financial institutional, wholesale organizations, information and 
credit rating agencies, and even business press publications are 
scarce, inexperienced and inadequate. Also, the previous system of 
industrial ministries destroyed the established relationship and 
planning agencies were eliminated as well. Newly independent or 
privatized enterprises are forced to establish new relationships, 
find new suppliers, buyers, marketing channels and partners. The 
research and development arms of the ministries have also become 
separated from enterprises reducing innovation and making it 
difficult to increase productivity or adapt new products. The 
other implication of independence or privatization is the fact that 
the management teams are now forced to do their own planning, a 
totally unfamiliar practice coupled with the erroneous belief that 
planning of any kind and free market capitalism do not mesh. In 
addition such unfamiliar decisions as price setting, marketing 
strategies, labor negotiations, new product development are 
required from managers that have never done such things and have 
nobody to ask. 
The Russian Ministry of Economics puts the decline in GNP as a 
percentage of the previous year at 2% in 1990, 9% in 1991, 19% in 
1992 and 16% in 1993. In total a 39% in four years. 
In 1992 the GDP reached 20 trillion rouble's with its deflator 
rising to 1,890% and the national income reached 15.6 trillion 
rouble's with a deflator of 2,120%. The physical output consisted 
of 81.2% of the 1991 levels. Retail trade declined by 39%, 
manufacturing by 18% and agriculture by 8%. Sales of major durable 
and soft goods dropped by 35-44%. The service sector also dropped 
by nearly 40%. 
Output of consumer goods also declined. Its volume amount was 4.7 
trillion rouble's, which is a 15% decrease against 1991 in 
comparable prices. The prices of food stuff fell more than 18%. 
At the same time profits in the corporate sector rose by a factor 
of 8 to 8.1 trillion rouble's, mostly due to inflation. Total 
corporate debt increased to 12.4 trillion rouble's. Of these 39 % 
were subsidized loans to strategic industries. 
A deep economic crisis continued in Russia in 1993. The production 
continued to fall with GNP falling by 14 - 16 % as compared to 
1992, industrial production fell by 17.2%, production of consumer 
goods by 11%, capital investment by 6%, and the value of provided 
services by 11%. The Federal budget was under a great strain. The 
revenues were falling due to the recession while the pressure to 
increase spending on social programs to compensate for declining 
standards of living as well as subsidies to struggling state 
enterprises to avoid layoffs. At the same time there was a dire 
need to lessen inflationary pressure. 
However with all these dismal figures there were some signs of a 
free market at work in that the production of successful products 
increased or decreased just barely while the production in 
inefficient items such as VCR's fell drastically. At the same time 
production of cars, refrigerators, TV sets, carpets, publications, 
cheese, sugar, daily products and alcoholic beverages rose fueled 
by a rising demand. 
WESTERN ASSISTANCE AND ITS IMPACT. There are several different aid 
packages under consideration. The most important one is the 
agreement to begin rescheduling of the $15 billion out of the 
Russian debt to 18 countries of the Paris club. The deal calls for 
only $1.95 billion in payments instead of the scheduled $40 billion 
in 1993. The rest will be amortised over the next ten years. 
Negotiations with the London club of over 600 commercial bank 
creditors to which Russia owes about $45 billion is also under 
progress. 
Of the new international aid the Tokyo meeting of the 'Group of 
seven' outlined major areas of Western financial assistance. It 
includes IMF stabilization funds of US $6 billion, IMF stand-by 
credit facilities of US $ 4.1 billion to improve balance of 
payments, bilateral export credits and guarantees of around US $10 
billion to western firms supplying their products to Russia. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has set up a fund 
of US $300 million, to help in the development and promotion of 
small and medium size businesses. 
The Russian government and reformers are unhappy about Western 
assistance levels and their form. Their argument is that despite 
continued aggravation of Russia's economic situation, the West only 
offers financial assistance in the form of high interest credits 
and not as free aid line that was extended when economic reforms 
were conducted in Japan and Germany. In addition the processing of 
most IMF, IBID and EBRD credits will take a long time and are 
burned with economic conditions that are difficult to obtain. 
ECONOMIC FORECAST: 1994. The Ministry of Economics predicted a 
decline of 5% in GDP, as opposed to a 12% drop in 1993 and 20% in 
1992. Also a 6% decline in industrial output and a 5% slump in 
agricultural was forecast. Monthly inflation rates were predicted 
to be 16% by March and 5-7% by the end of 1993. These predictions 
could be significantly off, especially the inflation figures, if 
the new cabinet pursues new policies. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also published 
a forecast for 1994 from several international organizations 
including OECD, UNESC, EC and Plan Econ. Decline in GDP is 
predicted to slow, unemployment to rise or become more open and 
annual inflation to slow as well. Plan Econ even goes as far as to 
predict a 3.5% annual GNP growth in 1995-1997. IRBD and UNESC 
predict a 2-5% growth for the entire FSU in 1998-2012. 
CaAPTER IIk TRADE AND CURRENT ACCOUNT STATISTICS. 
TRADE AND CXMEWI ACCOUNT STATISTICS. 
BACKGROUND: Russian trade is in a state of chaos. The old trading 
structures continue to crumble. The centralized import/export 
organization disintegrated while the new small scale private 
trading enterprises flourished. Before 1986, foreign transactions 
were tightly controlled through a central plan and the foreign 
currency budget. Approximately 70% of trade has been done on a 
clearing basis with socialist countries, Finland and India. 
Historically, trade with CMEA (Council For Mutual Economic 
Assistance) countries accounted to over 50% of Soviet exports and 
imports. FSU was the net exporter of heavy industrial goods and a 
net importer of consumer goods. This trade served to subsidize 
other CMEA countries every year by price and exchange rate 
manipulations. 
Since 1986 the government has taken steps to break the central 
monopoly on trade and stimulate the growth of exports. By creating 
the quasi government Foreign Trade Organization (FTO) in some 
sectors and allowing others to export independently. The new 
network was clumsy and ineffective with trade suffering a 
significant decline. This led to the explosion of small private 
trading organizations which made large profits but were unable to 
cope with the scope of trade. 
All the FSU Republics clearly experienced a trade collapse not only 
among themselves but also with other countries in Eastern Europe 
and with developed market economies. The total volume of trade 
declined due to the overall fall in production, decline in exports 
to former socialist countries, as well disruptions in the 
infrastructure. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the decline in the 
efficiency of the payment system and significantly increased the 
transaction costs of trade among its members. There are clear 
signs of falling back on less efficient but less risky payment 
methods such as barter and foreign currency. With the creation of 
the Interstate Bank to act as a multilateral clearing and 
settlement organization in the rouble zone the situation has 
improved. The collapse of the rouble zone, however can make this 
new bank obsolete in the near future. 
1993: AVAILABLE STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS. Volume of international 
trade fell by 23% in the first half of 1993 to 27 billion USD. 
While the main trading partners remain in Europe (68% of total) the 
volume has been steadily falling. The trade volume rose only with 
Asian countries: China-24%, Turkey-25% and Iran-166%. Trade with 
the United States fell by 39% and with Canada by 35%. Total trade 
with American countries average only 7% of total trade volume. 
Total exports fell by 3% to USD 18.2 billion. Over 60% consisted 
of petroleum products, 9% heavy machinery. Total imports fell by 
49% to USD 8.8 billion. Most imports consisted of consumer 
products . 
The composition of Russian Exports and Imports(in million USD).~ 
EXPORTS : 
PRODUCT Jan. - Oct. 92 Jan. - Oct. 93 93/92. 
Minerals 150 
Coal 593 
Crude Oil 6,726 
Petrochemicals 380 
Natural Gas 6,116 
Timber 363 
Machinery 945 
IMPORTS : 
PRODVCT Jan. - 8ct.92 Jan. - Oct. 33 93/92 
"c2t 
Citruses 
Grai~s 
!?heat 
c,,~.J~ 
"-Y 
~ c d i c i ~ b  
Clothing 
Sbszs 
?dchincry 
I 1 I Tqre is 2 aorprisin g trade scrplus of USD 7.4 billisn 2nd this 
cd,ds clarific~tisn. P7ith thh deduction of the barter and cledring 
operations thb s-rplus fslls tc 1 billion 2nd with~nt the gold 
sdles it beczxzs 2 dhficit. 
CHAPTER W FISCAL DEVELOPMENT AND MONETARY POLICY. 
FISCAL DEVELOPMENT AND MQNETARY POLICY. 
INFLATION. Russia has had a high inflation rate since the collapse 
of the communist economic system at the end of 1991. The initial 
jolt was given by the government liberalization of prices at the 
end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992. Most prices were 
decontrolled while the monopolistic nature of many industries 
remained the same and many enterprises remained state owned. This 
situation led to the monopolistic price setting and resulted in an 
even higher jump in prices than could be expected after the 
liberalization of prices that were virtually frozen for 70 years. 
After an initially tight monetary policy in the first quarter of 
1992, the Central Bank of Russia loosened credit for the rest of 
the year. The flood gates truly opened in the third quarter of 
1992, fueled by huge credits to state enterprises, loans to 
government and to other Republics to finance their trade deficits 
with Russia. The central Bank acted in cooperation with the 
Supreme Soviet in an effort to prevent further decline in output. 
The Ministry of Finance was bitterly opposed fearing a rise in 
inflation. "We increased the volume of credits in order to prevent 
a further fall in output and investment. But by late 1992 
recession had slightly slowed down, and we began to take 
restrictive measures," say's Mr.IZhandruev5. This view contradicted 
the position of the then Minister of Finance Mr.Fedorov and many 
international economists who thought that the monetary policy was 
already too lax and that the fall in output was caused by the 
breakdown of industry relationships. 
At any rate, the following chart demonstrates the growth of the 
money supply in 1992 and the first part of 1993. The cause of 
inflation becomes obvious. 
Average Monthly Rate of Money Supply Growth ( % ) =  
Money Supply(M3)total 12.7 15.4 29.1 17.1 
including: 
Cash Money 14.3 22.5 27.8 21.8 
'cruel to be kind, economist, december 1993. 
"merging market indicators, economist june 1993 
Non-Cash Funds 12.3 13.7 29.5 15.8 15.1 
The Central Bank kept its refinancing rate at 80% between May 1992 
and 1993 while the consumer prices rose by a factor of 24%. 
Alongside cheap direct bank credits to the enterprises, massive 
explicit subsidies were channeled from the state to the enterprise 
sector. In addition Central bank lending rates to Commercial 
Banks, and in turn their lending rates to the public remained 
negative until December 1993. This led to hyper inflation with 
figures reaching nearly 35% per month in 1992. The efforts by the 
Ministry of Finance to stem this tide were only partially 
successful when the Central Bank decreased emissions in 1992. The 
agreement was short lived. As the 1993 summer harvest season 
approached, the Central Bank initiated a new wave of agricultural 
credits, with the total credit expansion by the bank equalling 40% 
of the annual GDP. The inflation pattern has roughly followed 
these ebbs and flows of monetary growth with a lag of about four 
months. 
The consumer price index rose by 344% in 1993, fueled by a twofold 
increase in fuels, transportation tariffs, rents and liberalization 
of coal prices. 
Rise in Monthly Consumer Price Index.' 
Percent to previous month. 
MONTH 1992 1993 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Yearly Average 139 121 
The total inflation for 1992 caused a price increase by a factor of 
26 and in 1993 it was 1,300%. 
7emerging financial markets. economist January 1994. 
RUSSIAN FOREIGN DEBT SITUATION: Total external debt has increased 
drastically since the start of the reforms in 1985. During the 
first phase in 1985-87 the debt rose from 29 billion USD to 39 
billion. During the second phase of 1987-90 it rose to 52 billion. 
At the same time foreign currency reserves fell from 13 billion USD 
to only 5, while debt services rose from 8 billion to 13 billion 
USD. 
As of the end of 1992 the total Russian external debt stood at 74.6 
billion with 2.8 billion in overdue interest. During the first 
quarter of 1993 the debt decreased to 72.5 billion but the overdue 
amount increased to 4.7 billion. Debt on medium term credits 
totalled to $32.7 billion, down from $36.3 billion on January 1. 
The debt on commercial credits was $7.2 billion as of April 1, 1993 
up from $6.6 billion at the beginning of the year. The debt to 
foreign governments was about $35 billion while to commercial bank 
creditors, between $ 16-25 billion. 
Loan defaults by foreign governments on debt to Russia amount to 
USD 5.1 billion. A significant part of these are considered un- 
collectible. Over $7 billion in Russian loan payments were 
rescheduled. Total foreign debt increased by $11.4 billion. Total 
capital inflow was positive however capital in flight tendencies 
have escalated. Foreign currency reserves of the Central Bank rose 
to $4.1 billion mostly due to IMF  credit^.^ 
CAPITAL FLIGHT: While foreign credits amounted to 12.7 billion the 
positive balance of capital inflows amounted to only 7.1 billion. 
The apparent difference was kept by exporters in offshore accounts 
in violation of existing legislation. The total economic damage 
was calculated by the Central Bank to be over USD 6 billion. This 
allowed Russian commercial banks to significantly expand their 
offshore deposits. Legal capital flight alone, expressed in 
correspondent balances in offshore banks, amounted to $4.1 billion 
ip 1992. Another contributing factor is the large grey market for 
unregistered and illegal exports. Many companies evade government 
quotas and export licensing requirements by exporting their 
products through intermediaries and former Soviet Republics and 
keeping most of the proceeds abroad. Many companies deliberately 
lower the official price of their exports while channelling the 
remainder into offshore accounts. 
Total capital flight amounts to up to $17 billion. This creates an 
impression on the part of Western creditors that Russia should be 
able to increase its debt payment to more than the current 2-3 
spolicy research division, world bank, 1994. 
billion a year. This could be done only if the capital flight 
could be stopped. In order to do that far more stringent currency 
and custom contrbl as well as a significant improvement in the tax 
collection system. Weak custom control on the CIS borders due to 
budgetary constraints, massive corruption and the mafia influence 
would hamper these efforts for a significant period of time. 
CHAPTER V: SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS. 
SOCIO - ECONOMIC FACTORS. 
LABOR SITUATION. Under Russian statistical definitions total 
capable labor force, or all those by age and health able to work, 
consisted of 86 million. Total number of employed was 72 million. 
Just over 1 million people were registered with government 
unemployment agencies. The difference of 13 million between labor 
capable and employed/unemployed is explained by theoretically 
employable people choosing not to work. Of the 1 million 
registered 700,000 were classified as unemployed and 65.7% received 
unemployment benefits. In addition over 3 million workers were 
underemployed of which 1.9 million were furloughed with partial 
loss of salary. It is estimated that 11% of workers in the 
industry are now employed part time and that the total latent 
unemployment is estimated at 15 million. Furthermore, over 83,400 
enterprises employing over 26.2 million workers or 36% of the work 
force have announced plans to cut back on production and to 
restructure. Under such conditions it is estimated that open 
unemployment will reach 2-3 million in 1993. 
The percentage of female participation in the economy is very high 
by western standards. In addition, Russian women work longer hours 
since part time work is virtually non-existent with 99% employed 
full time. In December 1993 Yeltsin raised the minimum wage from 
7,740 to 14,620 rouble's a month. Stipends to students and other 
transfer payments were amended accordingly. The living standards 
that were never high in the FSU have fallen drastically. The 
average Russian has cut consumption to 40% of the 1991 level. 
Every third citizens on or under the poverty line of 10,000 
rouble's per month, this is 42% of the country's families. The 
average family spends about 65% of its income on foodstuff and the 
lowest one third spends as much as 80% of their income on a diet 
dominated by bread. 
LIVING STANDARDS. The average monthly wage as of September 1993 are 
as follows: 
.............................................................. 
RUSSIAN WAGES: SEPTEMBER 1993 
INDUSTRY AVERAGE WAGE 
Culture and Art 
Science 
Agriculture 
Education 6 0 
Health 6 7 
Public administration 8 0 
Industry 7 7 
Construct ion 11 0 
Transportation 120 
Finance 160 
Overall average 60* 
*All wages are in thousand of rouble's. 
Living standards that were never reasonably high in the former 
Soviet Union have drastically fallen. Now the average Russian has 
cut his consumption to 40% of the 1991 level. Every third citizen 
is or under the poverty line of 10,000 rouble's per month, this 
includes 42% of the countries families. The average family budget 
includes up to 65% spent on foodstuff while the lowest one third 
spend as much as 80% of their income on a diet dominated by bread. 
In 1992 consumers spent 63.9% of their income on goods and 
services, 10.1% on statutory payments and various contributions, 
and 4.5% on savings. Cash money on hand grew by 1.4 trillion 
rouble's, or 21.4% of the cash income, which corresponds to the 
1991 level. 
The average monthly income per capita in Russia as of November 1993 
was 37,908 rouble's which constituted about $25 at the official 
exchange rate of the period. For the employed it was sightly 
higher 42,799 while for pensioners it was 26,705.' 
Survey of opinions of Russian's as to what their economic future 
looks like . lo  
Question 1: Economic outlook for Russia over the next five years. 
Conditions will improve a great deal 23.2% 
Conditions will improve somewhat 58.9% 
No significant change will occur 11.4% 
Conditions will deteriorate somewhat 3.6% 
Conditions will deteriorate a great deal 2.9% 
'central european business information service, January 1994. 
"'reforming russia's economy, economist december 1993. 
Question 2: Economic outlook for Russia over the next 12 months. 
Conditions will improve a great deal 5.7% 
Conditions will improve somewhat 43.8% 
No significant change will occur 31.6% 
Conditions will deteriorate somewhat 13.8% 
Conditions will deteriorate a great deal 5.1% 
Question 3: Most important step towards improvement in the economy. 
Maintaining a stable rouble exchange rate 26.1% 
Adopting a simpler system of taxes 26.5% 
Improving the local infrastructure 7.9% 
Developing stronger foreign trade ties 11.3% 
Educating the work population about free market 12.1% 
Reducing government subsides to industries 6.7% 
Increasing government subsidies to industry 9.3% 
Question 4: How would you assess the political situation in Russia 
today? 
Development of democracy 14 % 
Preservation of the old order under new names 17% 
Establishment of a dictatorship 7 % 
Loss of order, increasing anarchy 4 2 9 
Hard to say 20% 
Profile of all respondents: 
Owners 
Self-employed 
Consultants 
Agents 
Managers 
Investors 
Joint venture participants 
The attitude of the people are extremely important for the success 
of the reform process. The feelings towards the reform process 
remains ambiguous. While the people seem to approve of reforms in 
principal most are disenchanted with the realities. Asked whether 
they consider the reform process to go to slow, just right or too 
fast, 64% opted for the first option and only 5% and 4% for the 
latter two. However the overall approval of the market system is 
still significant: 54% of the population feels that the effort to 
convert to a market economy is good for the country's future while 
only 25% feel the process to be harmful. On the other hand 39% 
that the chosen methods of reform are wrong while 33% agree with 
the governments choices. 
Russian business executives are moderately optimistic about their 
economic future. Most feel that their conditions will improve, 
however most also feel that the improvement will come later rather 
than in the near future. Support for radical economic measures is 
also weak while such perennial free market concerns as tax systems 
and education shows strength. 
CHAPTER VI: FINANCIAL MARKETS IN RUSSIA. 
FmANCIAL MARKETS IN RUSSIA. 
STOCK EXCHANGES AND BOND MMUQZTS: The first year of major activity 
and development in the Russian security market was 1991. The rapid 
growth was encouraged by the emergence of the legislative basis for 
security trading. Laws on 'Enterprises and Entrepreneurial 
Activity', 'Joint Stock Companies', and 'Issue and Circulation of 
Securities and on Stock Exchange'. Several types of securities are 
currently being traded on the Russian equity markets. They include 
privatization vouchers, stocks of newly privatized and fully 
private companies, four types of government securities and foreign 
currencies. The major stock exchanges are Moscow Central, Moscow 
International, Siberian and St. Petersburg Stock Exchanges. Five 
major groups of institutions involved in securities trading include 
commercial banks, private industrial enterprises, commodity and 
stock exchange, investment companies and mutual investment funds, 
trading and industrial companies. Stock remains the major 
securities traded. Commercial Bank stocks have been the most 
active offering high dividends of 150 - 200%. Bank shares take up 
as much as 50% of all shares traded. 
COMMODITY EXCHANGE: Commodity Exchanges have played an important 
role in Russia's modern history. They became the first really 
large institution to pave the way for market development. They 
introduced new techniques of trading and price formation that 
afterwards were implemented by the market. Finally Commodity 
Exchanges offered an unprecedented example of spontaneous 
renaissance and growth of private enterprises. 
Commodity Exchanges of 1988 - 1992 have played a major role in the 
developing of a free market. They were significantly flawed in the 
price formation and 'after-market' activities but they showed the 
way for free market price formation and exchange of goods replacing 
the formerly centralized distribution system. Several steps were 
taken by the government towards improving the operation of 
Commodity Exchanges in 1993. The government considers the 
Commodity exchanges to be instrumental in a free market system and 
aims to increase their activity and even channel government 
purchases through the exchange in future. 
COMMERCIAL BANKS: As of April, 1993 there were 5,627 Commercial 
Banks registered with the National Tax Service. Before the reforms 
the banking system was monopolized by 4 government structures. The 
Central Bank and 4 specialized banks for financing long term 
investment in industry (Promstroibank), agriculture (Agroprombank), 
communal and social services (Shilstosbank), and a savings bank, 
were the privileged institutions permitted to operate in the 
country. 
Decentralization and de-monopolization policies introduced early in 
1990 brought the 'two level' structure. While the Central Bank 
still remains at the top of the system newly born commercial banks 
have begun to mushroom during the last three years. Nearly 6000 
new establishments (headquarters and branches) are functioning at 
the retail level. Almost a third of the new banks have their 
origin in the former three major specialized banks who preferred to 
grant their ex-affiliates autonomy. There is a significant 
international participation in the Russian banking system. Russian 
bank are now allowed to participate in ownership of foreign 
financial institutions and banks. This requires special permission 
from the Central Bank. 
There are still serious problems in the Russian banking sector. 
The capability of the banks to screen the credit worthiness of 
prospective borrowers and to monitor their activities is limited, 
the extensive use of directed credit programs limits the role of 
the bank to passive intermediaries, inside lending is a wide spread 
phenomenon and the negative interest rates continue to prevail. 
Many banks are severely under-capitalized, have a weak deposit base 
and they have a weak loan portfolio with a sizeable portion of bad 
and unrecoverable loans. 
PRIVATIZATION EFFORTS. Nearly three years ago, Russia embarked on 
the crucial part of its effort to become a market economy: selling 
the property of the state that once owned everything and thus 
founding a nation of property owners with a stake in the success in 
economic reforms. When the end of price controls wiped out 
savings, the Government chose to conjure up a middle class by 
giving away most of state property, issuing 144 million vouchers 
free to every Russian to turn into shares. 
Now with most businesses and two-thirds of the Russian work force 
formally under private control, the voucher program has effectively 
ended and real capitalism, using real money finally begins. This 
second stage will be the stiffest test of whether the free market 
will really catch on in this vast distorted economy. Private 
companies are being thrown into a perilous environment where credit 
is hard to get, debt among companies is are high, management is 
weak, crime is rampant, taxes are punitive and consumers are poorer 
than they were three years ago. 
In July 1994, with some exceptions, the government, began selling 
its remaining enterprises - for cash, not vouchers. The companies, 
many of which are starved for capital, are to get 51% of the 
purchase price. Private enterprises will also be able to sell 
land, and private investors should now be able to exercise more 
control over management. l1 
FUTURE OF PRIVATIZATION: A privatization program for 1995 is being 
prepared for submission to the new Federal Assembly by the State 
Property Committee. Under the proposed program, about 100 large 
enterprises with capital of more than 1 billion rouble's will be 
targeted for privatization. For the most part these enterprises 
will be in the oil and gas sector, automobiles and machine tool 
building. The draft plan would also make it easy to privatize 
enterprises in the defense industry and land. In addition the 
privatization of export agencies owned by the Foreign Economic 
Relations Ministry is anticipated with the government maintaining 
controlling interest in the main commodity export agency. 
PROBLEMS: Russia's stock market has emerged with astonishing speed. 
The first stage of mass privatization, which began in December 1992 
and ended in June 1994, put more than 14,000 large and medium-sized 
enterprises and their workers into private hands and created 40m 
shareholders. Many of these shares are now worthless, either 
because their issuer is bankrupt in all but name, or because no one 
will make prices in them. However, there is now a liquid market in 
the shares of the 50 largest companies. This market is not for the 
faint hearted; prices move with stomach churning speed. For eg. 
the shares in Perm Motors, a maker of aircraft engines, fell by 
43%(in dollar terms); shares in Kamaz, a maker of trucks, rose by 
29%. Shareholders can be treated roughly. 
If Russia's stock market and privatization efforts are to gain 
credibility, it needs to establish a few basic rules, enforced by 
a credible regulator. These include establishing shareholder 
rights, clarifying who owns the land on which privatized 
enterprises are sitting, and establishing a central depository and 
custodian for shares to make the secondary market more liquid. 
Since it has a residual stake of around 30% in nearly all of the 
privatized companies, and stage two of privatization involves 
selling these stakes to finance government spending, it is in the 
interest of the government to get these things correct. 
What is surprising is that Yeltsin has entrusted the next stage of 
the privatization efforts to Valdimir Polevanov, whose only 
conceivable qualification is that he is loyal to Yeltsin. His 
views on privatization until. now have been alarming,"Like day has 
"lurching into the capitalist era ... new york times, july 1994. 
night and life has death, privatization should have 
nationalization." He feels that the reckless denationalization of 
the aluminum, energy and defense industries has damaged Russia's 
national Security. He feels that foreigners should not be allowed 
to buy stakes in these sectors as it is bad for Russia's security.12 
The US is spending $13 million annually to help Russia in its 
privatization plans. 
''the problems of polevanov, economist January 1995. 
CHAPTER W. INVESTING AND OPERATING IN RUSSIA. 
INVESTING AND OPERATING IN RUSSIA. 
There is precious little information and hands on advice for 
western companies operating in Russia. New rules are constantly 
being adapted, reworked, withdrawn and changed. Some laws come out 
including deadlines long passed. In some areas there are no laws 
and regulations governing economic activity at all. In addition, 
with the absence of common law, one cannot look to courts to 
provide guidance. Contracts are unenforceable and government 
regulators are often corrupt. Accordingly it is necessary to 
understand as much as possible about the rule of the game before 
investing or even making a decision to invest. 
The following are some of the rules that an investor in Russia 
should 
Rule 1: If you want to be making money in Russia ten years from 
now, you have to get to work now. Russia is no place for fast 
deals. Negotiations are protracted, putting together a deal 
involves many steps; the language barrier is enormous, it takes a 
long time to build up trust, trust is vital. Market research is 
very important as the information and statistics are less than 
satisfactory. Financial statements are prepared without any 
recognized or uniform accounting statements and are unaudited. 
Rule 2 :Good partners, not legal recourse are a foreign investors 
best protection in Russia. Business is based on friendship and 
personal understanding. 
Rule 3 :Western companies that do best are the ones in which the 
top management get personally involved and the country reams are 
stable. The buck still stops at the top in Russia. Lower ranking 
business officials have little independent authority. 
Rule 4 :Begin small locally. In contrast with experiences of doing 
business during the time of the centralized Soviet system, the 
projects that are making money in Russia today are not the big 
deals negotiated at the top of the government, but the smaller ones 
that have begun at the lower level, 
Rule 5 :Do not insist on full formal control. This is the most 
difficult rule for Western companies, because it is the hardest to 
justify to banks and boards. Full formal control is the most 
sensitive issue in the business world of Russia. Full western 
ownership, without a Russian partner is the most controversial of 
all. 
"russia 2010 and what it means for the world, by daniel yergin and thane gustafson 
GENERAL OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES. Important operational problems 
often cited by foreign investors, include the hiring of Soviet 
workers, quality control, finance from foreign sources, political 
risk insurance, custom duties and tariffs and a relationship with 
the local government. There is no clear legal frame work governing 
relations between the joint venture and the government at local or 
federal levels. The most serious operational problem stems from 
the difficulty in developing a reliable means of securing supplies. 
Management is another problem as there is a lack of trained 
managers and key employees, there is a lack of understanding of 
marketing principles, of ones competition and how to cut down 
costs. 
Predictably, a host of other problems associated with poor 
infrastructure such as domestic and international communications, 
office facilities, banking and related financial services, housing 
and other amenities are also a major barrier to Western investors. 
Additionally the lack of enforceability of contracts and the lack 
of organized dispute settlement are problems as, old Soviet courts 
are ill prepared to deal with new economic disputes and laws are 
unclear and sometimes contradictory. 
COUNTRY-RISK RATING. l4 
Iraq 
Russia 
Nigeria 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Philippines 
Turkey 
Mexico 
Poland 
Greece 
India 
South Africa 
China 
Israel 
Indonesia 
Thailand 
Malaysia 
14emerging-market indicators, economist, december 1994. 
Chile - - - - - - - - 30% 
Czech Republic -------- 30% 
South Korea ------ 25% 
Hong Kong ----- 20% 
Taiwan ----- 20% 
Singapore --lo%. 
TAX SYSTEM. The tax rates in Russia remain high in comparison with 
US policies: 
Employer payroll 39% 
Employee payroll 1 % 
Income (top marginal) 30% 
Income(lowest marginal) 12% 
VAT ( standard) 20% 
Corporate (standard) 32% 
Capital gains 30% 
The estimate of the total effective tax rate given the above 
combination of taxes ranges between 55% and 63% depending on the 
model used. The effective tax rate on capital. income is an 
astonishing 97.8%. These effective rates are about 15-20% higher 
than in other Central European countries but is on par with other 
FSU republics. 
Indirect taxes have remained a key source of revenue, especially 
due to the introduction of VAT. New profit taxes are to play a 
more important role in the future due to their importance to a 
market economy. However due to inflation and weak government 
control leading to tax evasion and late payments are significantly 
eroding the government revenue base. The VAT is assessed to 
foreign goods at the point of entry. It covers foreign currency 
sales and is to be paid in foreign currency. Food, medicine and 
children's clothing are untaxed. Profit tax is collected in 
advance payment biweekly from enterprises and quarterly from joint 
ventures. Tax on excess wage increases is assessed and paid 
quarterly. Wage income tax is withheld from the payroll and the 
withholding is final; no annual adjustment is made. For the self 
employed advance payments are due quarterly and the annual form is 
filled by January 15. 
The major problem with the tax situation in Russia, however, 
remains the fact that no clear collection and disputer resolution 
procedures are established and many items remain unclassified and 
undefined . 
BANRRUPTCY LAW. The Russian parliament approved a bankruptcy law 
on 12 November 1992. Although it was expected that enforcement 
would begin in March 1993, the Russian government acknowledged in 
February 1993 that it would not attempt to enforce the bankruptcy 
laws due to the perceived lack of resources. 
Securities Regulations. Current securities regulations are 
underdeveloped and unsophisticated but and effort is on the way by 
German and British teams to draw plans for new rules. Current 
rules establish a mechanism for conducting both public and private 
placement of securities. Initial offerings by a joint stock 
company must: be registered with the Ministry of Finance, unless 
offering exceeds one billion rouble's, in which case Federal 
approval is needed. Placement of banking company stock must also 
be registered with the Central Bank. Private placement, require a 
signed application accompanied by notarized corporate document and 
a management decisions statements including the terms of issuance, 
the use of the proceeds and the list of investors. Public 
placement must include all the information required of a private 
placement plus a prospectus, all of which must be available to 
potential investors and the mass media. 
MAFIA INFLUENCE. During the years of reform a new and dangerous 
phenomenon emerged in Russia. After 70 years of total police 
control the dismantled KGB and ousted Communist party officials 
joined the growing organized crime divisions. By some estimates 
these organizations now control as much as 60% of all commercial 
structures in Russia. They are especially prevalent in the most 
profitable and easy to control sectors such as retail, whole sale 
and international trade. Now they are starting to move into more 
profitable, lucrative and bigger industries such as banking, real 
estate and mineral exports. 
The explosion of criminality in Russia is due to the enormous money 
being to be made in the Russian market. Most of the countries 
assets are up for grabs. Moreover, Russia's economic potential, 
both as an exporter and as a market, is so large that the first 
entrepreneurs to commercialize a given sector can earn vast 
profits. 
CHAPTER VIIk FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TN RUSSIA. 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA 
IMPORTANCE: The presence of a positive FDI flow is extremely 
important for the progress of reforms. To the extent that more FDI 
improves the supply side flexibility of the economic policies and 
generally stimulates growth, it contributes to the success of the 
reform programs, reduces the probability of their reversal and may 
thus also add to political stability. By exposing public 
administrators to market-based thinking, early foreign investors 
may contribute to smoother bureaucratic procedures and less 
discretion in the future. By increasing the competitiveness of 
markets, they may speed up the process of relative price 
realignment. By their presence, they may induce a private 
provision for a financial and distribution infrastructure, thus 
enhancing information and reducing transaction costs. In contrast, 
the absence of a positive FDI can be a factor in stymieing reform 
efforts by prolonging the transition and thus increasing the 
probability of policy reversal. 
TOTAL E'DI IN RUSSIA: Few, if any countries offer as potentially 
attractive opportunities for large scale foreign direct investment 
as Russia. It possesses a vast internal market, a critical need 
for an efficient and expanded consumer goods industry. It has 
enormous natural resources whose efficient exploitation would yield 
large benefits both to Russia and to foreign investors. It has 
large untapped business opportunities resulting from the conversion 
of the defense industries, a woefully underdeveloped service sector 
- including the basic distribution system and business-related 
services, where foreign know-how would be extremely valuable and 
the general need to import foreign technology, managerial skills 
and experience in operating in a market environment. 
The total foreign direct investment in Russia has been minimal to 
date in terms of foreign capital actually invested. The main 
factors hampering investment are inadequacies in political 
stability, economic and in the regulatory environment. 
Among the investors, US corporations proved by far the most active 
with more than triple the number of deals than the next most active 
country, Germany. South Korea was a surprising third, with other 
European countries and Japan closely following. In total 
investment value, however Cyprus emerged as a surprising leader. 
Considering the fact, however, that several billion US dollars in 
Russian flight capital is hidden in Cyprus, the surprise 
evaporates. In reality Russian banks and exporters are channeling 
the off-shore capital back into Russia through fronting Cyprus 
companies. Among the true foreign investors the US retains 
primacy, South Korea with its Siberian investments is second and 
Germany, France and Italy closely follow. In joint ventures alone 
the US dominates closely followed by Germany. 
Foreign Direct Investment in Russia is being distributed into 
several major areas of the economy. Investment into the oil and 
gas industry, spurred by the Framework Agreement on Oil and Gas 
between the World Bank and the Exim Bank of the US leads the way, 
several other industries are proving attractive for foreign 
investors. Electronics and Telecom sector has actually attracted 
higher number of deals than oil and gas, albeit lower in total 
value. The automotive, aerospace, hotels, mining and banking 
industries have also attracted investment interest. The trend in 
joint ventures alone is somewhat different. As much as 80% of 
these are dedicated to the service sector. 
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION. 
CONCLUSION. 
When writing about the prospects of the states of the former Soviet 
Union, observers confront the same problem that baffled them in 
1918: not only is it hard to guess where the region is headed, it 
is also unclear how far the disintegration from a unified empire to 
splintered sub-parts will go. So severe and complex is the crisis 
that the only certain fact is the existence of innumerable 
uncertainties. This makes it inordinately difficult to estimate 
the region's ability to prepare for the twenty-first century, since 
its leadership is primarily concerned with surviving the present 
chaos and its people are overwhelmed by the daily need to make ends 
meet. In such circumstances little energy is left to consider 
global trends, let alone adjust to newer challenges. 
Four years of radical economic reform have failed. Shock therapy 
has made inflation worse, not better. A few people have grown rich 
but most face poverty. Crisis threatens: at best widespread social 
unrest, at worst a decent into anarchy. The problem at present is 
too little reform, not too much. To understand this one has to go 
back to Gorbachev and the beginnings of post communist Russia. 
Gorbachev's greatness lay in his capacity to destroy everything he 
tried to save- his party's monopoly on power, its idealogy and its 
empire. As for economic reforms, "virtually every mistake that 
could be made was made" by, Gorbachev.15 By the end 1991, Russia's 
share of the Soviet Union's budget was equal to 31% of Russia's 
GDP. Industrial output-the collapse of which is now blamed on 
reformers-fell 19% in 1991. 
Gorbachev's last two Prime Ministers, Nikolai Ryzhkov and Valentin 
Pavlov, spent all the Soviet Union's foreign-currency reserves 
trying to conceal the disaster. Its own money gone, the government 
appropriated $10 billion deposited by Russian and Foreign companies 
in the state-owned foreign exchange banks. At the end of 1991, the 
Soviet Union collapsed. Boris Yeltsin was elected president of 
Russia, he appointed a team of reformers lead by Gaidar to sort out 
the mess. Foreign reserves were very low, the shops were empty and 
there appeared real danger of widespread hunger in big cities. 
According to Grigory Yavlinsky, an economist who is one of Gaidar's 
main political rival, the Gaidar team's great mistake was to 
liberalize prices before breaking up the monopolies which had 
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dominated the Soviet economy. l6 In an ideal world, Yavlinsky ' s 
prescription would have been correct. But there was nothing ideal 
about Rilssia in the Summer of 1992. The priority was to get goods 
into the shops and the only way to do that was by liberalizing 
prices. In January Gaidar lifted price controls from 90% of traded 
goods. By the next day prices had risen by an average of 250%. 
That was the bad news, the good news was that the shops quickly 
began filling their shelves. 
Western aid has been pouring into Russia in an attempt to prop up 
Yeltsin and democracy. The West should resist the urge to pour in 
aid indiscriminately, especially in the light of Russia's election 
and the rebirth of militancy. Government -to-Government transfers 
will not help Russia, like transfers to third world countries has 
not helped them develop. Aid to a certain extent has 
institutionalized corruption, entrenched atavistic institutions, 
and side lined the private sector to the black market. The Western 
nations in an attempt to help , should encourage the Russians to 
introduce reforms to stimulate entrepreneurship, enter into free 
trade agreements with Russia and the struggling ex-Soviet 
republics, promote private investment by eliminating -incentives to 
it in their own countries, help finance mass privatization of the 
russian economy, forgive or restructure the foreign debt incurred 
by the FSU and finance the dismantling of nuclear weapons. 
Russia on the other hand should be advised to establish a regime of 
low taxation and minimal regulation, uphold and expand private 
property rights under a rule of law, and establish investment laws 
and trade policies that would attract foreign capital and stimulate 
rapid growth of the private sector. Another way in which the West 
can help the FSU is by removing all trade barriers. Nations that 
have received most Western aid since World War I1 report that 
lowering barriers to trade is far more helpful to their development 
than are large amounts of Government-to Government aid transfers. 
Once and for all, the West should end its out-dated reliance on 
large scale government-to-Government aid. The world can ill afford 
the consequences of turning Russia into a international welfare 
dependency. Massive aid to Russia only would entrench unproductive 
institutions and prolong the crisis. A better solution is to base 
development on the proven success of free markets and free 
enterprise. 
The last thing the west should do for Russia, is to get rid of 
Boris Yeltsin. There was a time when the world could hope for 
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great things from Yeltsin. As Russia's first democratically 
elected president he set out to establish , by the people's consent 
, a stable, free market democracy. Given the problems afflicting 
what is, in effect, the worlds sixth continent, that was going to 
be an awesome task. Yet over the last year Yeltsin mistakes have 
become so glaring that, even before the bloody battle in Grozny, 
Yeltsin the tsar of democracy had already shrunk in historical 
size. Still there was hope that, for all his mistakes, Yeltsin 
would keep the momentum of reform going and hold off the challenges 
from communist and nationalist forces. Now even that hope looks 
ready for burial. Once the reforming strongman, Yeltsin is now the 
wrong man to lead a reforming Russia. 
What to do? We have lost our way. From afar, the Demon cries out, 
He is leading us astray. 
-Alexander Pushkin. 
APPENDIX 
THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL HI OH LIGHTS.^' 
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES 
-Russia is "a democratic federative, rule-of-law state with a 
republican form of government." 
-Principles of separation of powers among the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches, with a strong presidency. 
-Fundamental principles of human rights are guaranteed. 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 
-The delineation of responsibility and power between the federal 
government and local authorities is defined. 
-Local self government is recognized and guaranteed and 
jurisdiction is defined. 
RULE OF LAW 
-The constitution and federal laws are paramount. 
-Republics may have their own constitution and legislation. Other 
localities may have their own charters and legislation. 
BUSINESS PRINCIPLES 
-The Russian Federation is a unified economic area. 
-Freedom of economic activity, support for competition, free 
movement of goods, services, and capital are guaranteed. 
-The rights of private owners is protected. Property may not be 
expropriated except by a court order. 
-Land and natural resources can be privately owned."Owners freely 
possess, use and dispose of land and other natural resources." 
-All forms of property-private, state, municipal and other forms- 
enjoy equal recognition and protection. 
-Economic activity aimed at monopolization or unscrupulous 
competition is not permitted. 
-Newly introduced taxes cannot be retroactive. 
-Right to inherit property is guaranteed. 
-Intellectual property is protected by law. 
-A minimum wage is guaranteed. 
-Citizens have the right to freely dispose of their labor and 
choose the nature of their work. 
-The right to work in a safe and clean condition is protected. 
-The right to strike is "recognized." 
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PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY 
-Elected to a four-year term; serves no more than two consecutive 
terms. 
-Can issue decrees and directives whose implementation is 
mandatory. 
-Appoints the prime minister with confirmation by the State Duma 
(lower house) . 
-Appoints deputy prime minister and other federal ministers. 
-Can dismiss the prime minister and his ministers and dissolve the 
State Duma in limited, specific instances. 
-Is the supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 
-If unable to perform his duties is temporarily replaced by the 
prime minister. 
-Impeachment articles are clearly defined. 
POWERS OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
-Federal Assembly has two chambers, the Federation Council 
consisting of two representatives from each constituent part of the 
Russian federation, and the State Duma, which consists of 450 
deputies elected by combination of party lists and individual 
districts. 
-State Duma deputies hold four-year terms (cannot hold other 
positions except to serve in the government) and the Federation 
Council terms are to be determined later. 
ADOPTING LAWS 
-Legislation can be proposed by the president, Federation Council, 
Duma, the government, or regional legislatures. For matters under 
their jurisdiction legislation may be introduced by the 
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and Superior Court of 
Arbitration. The laws are first introduced into the State Duma 
then sent to the federation Council. There is a conference 
committee to reconcile differences but the Duma can override the 
council's rejection by a 2/3 majority. 
-Adopted laws must be signed by the president. 2/3 vote in both 
houses are required for over riding the veto. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMCNDMENTS 
-Elaborate process is required. 
JUDICIAL BRANCH 
-Judges are independent and subordinate only to the constitution 
and to federal law. 
-Constitution Court consists of 19 judges and hears constitutional 
issues and resolves disputes over areas of jurisdiction. Supreme 
Court is the highest court for civil, criminal, administrative and 
other cases. Superior Court of Arbitration is the highest court 
for the resolution of economic disputes. 
-Justices for these high courts are nominated by the president and 
confirmed by the Federation Council. Judges in lower federal 
courts are appointed by the president. 
CENTRAL BANK 
-President nominates the chairman of the Central Bank, which 
requires confirmation by the Duma. The Duma can remove the 
chairman or the President can recommend such removal. 
-Basic function of the Central Bank is to protect and guarantee the 
stability of the rouble. 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND -OMS 
-Extensive Human and Civil rights are guaranteed. 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY 
(1) Erlanger, Steven, "Lurching into the capitalist era, Russia 
sells its factories for cash," The New York Times, July 1994. 
This article contained information on Russia's privatization 
efforts, the progress, the problems and as to where it stands 
today. This article helped me to come to the conclusion that 
though Russia is trying to become a free-market economy it is still 
bereft with problems. 
(2) "Emerging Market Indicators," The Economist, June 1993. 
This article provided me with charts on the emerging markets in the 
world. It helped me conclude that Russia is the last of the 
emerging markets that one should invest in. 
(3) "Reforming Russia's economy," The Economist, December 1993. 
This article contained information on pre-reform Russia, on 
Gorbachev, on Yeltsin and on Gaidars reform policies and their 
effects. 
(4) "Cruel To Be Kind," The Economist, December 1993. 
This is a follow up to the earlier article. It deals with the 
reforms, their progress and the hardships that they have caused in 
Russia. 
(5) "Emerging Financial Markets," The Economist, January 1994. 
This article provides one with conclusive proof that Russia is the 
last place to invest ones money. 
(6) "What Is Russian For Free Press," The Economist, January 1994. 
This article was about the elections in late 1993 Russia. It deals 
with the rise of ultra-nationalism and gives a break down on how 
the parties fared in the election. 
(7) "Emerging Market Indicators," The Economist, December 1994. 
This article once again is about the worlds emerging markets and 
puts Russia as the worst market to invest in. 
(8) "Problems of Polevanov," The Economist, January 1995. 
This article is about Russia's stock market, its privatization 
efforts and the problems faced. The main thrust of the article is 
on Mr. Polevanov who has become Minister in charge of 
Privatization. it talks about how inefficient, unqualified and 
nationalistic he is. 
(9) Kennedy, Paul; "Prewarina for the 21st Centurv. 1993. Page 
228-249. 
This book is a synthesis of extensive research in fields ranging 
from demography to robotics in order to draw a detailed persuasive 
and often shocking map of the very near future. It also paints a 
vivid picture of the FSU and Russia and as to where it is headed. 
(10) Rourke, John T; "Takina Sides," sixth edition. 
This book is written in the form of a debate and is designed to 
introduce readers to controversies in world politics. This book 
provided me with information on the positive and negative aspects 
of investing in Russia. 
(11) Schememann, Serge; "Salzhenitsvn's DeeDest Russia ... is it 
gtill there?." The New York Times, May 1994. 
This article dealt with Solzhenitsyn, his feelings on his return to 
his homeland, his hopes for Russia and as to where Russia may 
eventually go. 
SECONDARY 
(1) "Central European Business Services," January 1994. 
(2) The Economist. 
(a) "The Battle for Russia." October 1993. 
(b) "How to get Russia respected." November 1993. 
(c) "The House divided." December 1993. 
(d) "Sale of the century." May 1994. 
(e) "Russia.. the next crisis." November 1994. 
(f) "Why Chechnya matters." December 1994. 
(g) "The wrong man for Russia." January 1995. 
[ 3 )  Policy Research Division. World Bank 1994. 
(4) TIME 
(a) "Hello I must be going." January 1994. 
(b) "Move over Yeltsin." February 1994. 
(c) "If it moves, tax it." May 1994. 
(d) "A voice in the wilderness." June 1994. 
(e) "At your service." October 1994. 
(f) "Ruble or rubble." October 1994. 
